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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 1846, William Bailey walked away from a quarrel with
Thomas Prince to join several friends gathered on a nearby piazza. As Bailey
stood chatting with others, Prince came up, cursed him, and accused him of
cutting a button off his coat. Prince further demanded that the two resolve the
matter with a fight, but when Bailey refused, he walked away. However, the
issue did not end there. Jesse Bailey overheard the exchange and castigated his
brother as a coward for refusing to fight Prince. Embarrassed before his friends,
William Bailey tossed down his drink and followed Prince down the road.
* J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of U.S. Legal History, Department of History, University
of Florida, Gainesville; Affiliated Professor, Legal History, Levin College of Law, University of
Florida, Gainesville. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the American Historical
Association Annual Meeting, January 7,2002; the Third Annual Meeting of the Historical Society
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, April 20, 2001; American Society of Legal History
Annual Meeting, October 20,2000; and the Legal Research Workshop, Washington and Lee Law
School, April 19, 2000. Research for this project was made possible by grants from the South
Carolina Bar Association and the University of Florida College of Liberal Arts and Sciences.
1. The summary of the fight in this paragraph is based on the coroner's record. See State v.
The Dead Body of William Bailey (July 19, 1846), in THE CORONER'S INQUISITION BOOK FOR
EDGEFIELD DISTRICT, 1844-1850, at 57-64, microformed on Roll No. ED 169 (South Carolina
Department of Archives and History "SCDAH") [hereinafter BAILEY CORONER'S RECORD].
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When he caught up with him, Bailey told Prince that they needed to talk, but
Prince replied he had no interest in conversation. Once again, he accused
Bailey of cutting the button off his coat; once again, Bailey denied having done
so, though he added that if a button had come off, it had been by accident.
Needless to say, Prince was unappeased and, shaking his left fist in Bailey's
face, insisted that they fight. Suspicious, perhaps because Prince kept his right
hand in his pocket, Bailey asked Prince if he was armed, a question Prince
countered by asking Bailey the same thing. After Bailey declared that he was
not, the two began to exchange insults until finally, after each called the other
a liar, Bailey punched Prince. Prince then pulled his right hand, holding a knife,
from his pocket and struck Bailey three "licks"-once in the side, once on the
shoulder, and, finally, once across his throat. As blood gushed from Bailey's
neck, several of his friends, who had wandered down from the piazza to watch
the affray, 2 rushed to his side. One got there in time to catch him before he
slumped to the road.3
Within minutes, Bailey was dead.4 The legal system reacted almost as
quickly, but its ultimate response was tepid. At the coroner's inquest called
later that day, the jury concluded that Prince murdered Bailey; 5 shortly
thereafter, the grand jury indicted Prince for murder.6 However, that fall, at trial
before the Court of General Sessions in Ed~efield, South Carolina, the jury
found Prince guilty only of manslaughter. The trial judge, A. P. Butler,
sentenced Prince to five years in the local jail and ordered him to pay a fine of
$100.00.8
From its start as a deadly battle over the loss of a button, to its end with
Prince receiving a mild punishment after being found guilty of a lesser crime,
State v. Prince is the type of case that led generations of legal historians to
2. Fights of this sort were typically called affrays, a term that was a holdover from English
practice (and French law). Blackstone defined an affray as "the fighting of two or more persons
in some public place, to the terror of his majesty's subjects." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 145 (1769).
3. BAILEY CORONER'S RECORD, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. True Bill, State v. Thomas Prince (Oct. 8, 1846), in MINUTES, COURTOF COMMON PLEAS
AND GENERAL SESSIONS, EDGEFIELD DISTRICT, Spring Term 1846, microformed on Roll No. ED
85 (SCDAH).
7. Verdict, State v. Thomas Prince (Oct. 8, 1846), in MINUTES, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
AND GENERAL SESSIONS, EDGEFIELD DISTRICT, Fall Term 1846, microformed on Roll No. ED 85
(SCDAH).
8. Sentence, State v. Thomas Prince (Oct. 8, 1846), in MINUTES, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
AND GENERAL SESSIONS, EDGEFIELD DISTRICT, Fall Term 1846, microformed on Roll No. ED 85(SCDAH). Two years into his sentence, Prince died in the jail of fever. See State v. The Dead
Body of Thomas Prince (July 31, 1845), in THE CORONER'S INQUISITION BOOK FOR EDGEFIELD
DISTRICT, 1844-1850, microformed on Roll No. ED 169 (SCDAH).
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assert that South Carolina epitomized antebellum Southern lawlessness.9 In the
first half of the nineteenth century, when states to the north increasingly relied
on formal law as a means of social control' ° and transformed their court
systems,"I shedding English practices 12 and systematizing their procedures,
13
most southern states lagged behind. But none hung so far back as South
Carolina. In the words of historian Michael Hindus, in antebellum South
Carolina "the law did not reach many areas of life, institutions such as courts
were kept weak, and local instruments of law enforcement ranged from
ineffective to incompetent."' 14 Hindus adds that such justice as there was in
antebellum South Carolina was often extralegal and typically violent:
"[P]lantation justice handled much slave crime; dueling substituted for some
forms of litigation; mob activity policed city streets; vigilantes patrolled
country bounds."' 5
Recent studies of nineteenth century legal culture,'6 North and South, have
called parts of that picture into question, 17 but the prevailing view of the legal
culture of antebellum South Carolina remains unchanged-it was shaped by
honor and marked by the hierarchical assumptions' 8 and extralegal violence
9. See, e.g., JACKKENNY WILLIAMS, VOGUES IN VILLAINY 16(1959) (citing Bailey's murder
as an example of that lawlessness); see generally ORVILLE VERNON BURTON, IN MY FATHER'S
HOUSE ARE MANY MANSIONS 90 (1985) (discussing violence and Southern honor in the context
of a local study of Edgefield, South Carolina); MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND
PLANTATION (1980) (comparing South Carolina and Massachusetts to illustrate regional
differences in Northern and Southern Criminal Law).
10. CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION 54-55 (1991) (citations omitted).
11. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-
1880 (1989); Michael Millender, The Transformation ofthe American Criminal Trial, 1790-1875
(1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author).
12. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 1-10 (1975).
13. Id.; Millender, supra note 11.
14. HINDUs, supra note 9, at 1.
15. Id. at 36.
16. Throughout this Article I use the phrase "legal culture" to refer to the congeries of formal
(i.e., court-based) and informal (or extralegal) means of achieving justice. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER2 (1998) ("The choices ordinary people make between formal law
and vigilante justice can be called their legal culture. This includes concepts and habits ofjustice
as well as understandings of the role and potency of formal and informal rules, rights, and
authority.").
17. See, e.g., PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD 11-12 (1995)
(asserting that formal law played a larger role in the antebellum South than earlier studies had
suggested and noting that neither violence nor lawlessness were unique to the South); SALLY E.
HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS 14-24 (200 1) (discussing the organized nature of the slave patrols in
South Carolina); see also ROGERLANE, MURDER IN AMERICA 92-145 (1997) (noting that the courts
in the antebellum North were often tolerant of extralegal violence); ERIC H. MONKKONEN,
MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 151-79 (2000) (demonstrating that there was extralegal, often honor-
based, violence in antebellum New York).
18. See, e.g., Laura F. Edwards, Law, Domestic Violence, and the Limits of Patriarchal
Authority in the Antebellum South, 65 J. S. HIST. 733 (1999) (describing and analyzing racial and
gender inequalities present in the antebellum Southern judicial system).
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that honor engendered. 19 In this Article, I offer a modification of that well-
established account. While I do not question the influence of honor on South
Carolina's antebellum legal culture, I suggest that the state had a second,
shame-based system of popular justice, in which women played a prominentrl20
role. As was the case with honor culture, this second form of extralegaljustice, which I have dubbed the informal courts of public opinion,21 sometimesintersected with formal law, and other times worked independent of it.
II. BACKGROUND: THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF HONOR'S INFLUENCE ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA
For over fifty years, scholars have asserted that the distinctive legal culture
of the antebellum South rested on honor.22 Although a few have argued that
honor completely supplanted law, 23 most have concluded that the situation was
more complex, allowing law and honor to function both as independent sources
of justice and as intersecting processes. 24
The relation between law and honor was particularly multifaceted in
antebellum South Carolina. There the rituals and practices of honor culture
19. See discussion infra Part II.
20. See discussion infra Parts 1Il, IV.
21. The workings of these courts resemble the forms of private, informal law enforcement
methods that have been the subject of some recent legal scholarship. See, e.g., Walter 0.
Weyrauch, Unwritten Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1211, 1215-20(1999) (describing experiment analyzing potential growth of competing legal systems in prolonged
space flights).
22. See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE 9-33 (1984) (noting that the
honor culture bred in violence in the nineteenth-century South); BARDAGLIO,supra note 17, at 5-
23 (discussing the making of Southern legal culture); ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER 47-
71 (2000) (discussing the "important cultural place" of honor in the Deep South); BERTRAM
WYAT-T-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR 362-401 (1982) (discussing honor's role in a "Slavocracy");
Charles S. Sydnor, The Southerner and the Laws, 6 J. S. HIST. 3, 13 (1940) (discussing the
"unwritten code" wherein Southerners found guidance).
23. Consider the conclusion of Edward Ayers, commenting on law in the antebellum South:
Honor and legalism, as students of other honor-bound societies have
observed, are incompatible: "to go to law for redress is to confess publicly
that you have been wronged and the demonstration of your vulnerability
places your honor in jeopardy, ajeopardy from which the 'satisfaction' of
legal compensation in the hands of secular authority hardly redeems it."
AYERS, supra note 22, at 20, & 284 n.27 (quoting Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status,
in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 19, 30 (J.G. Peristiany ed.,
1965)); see also BURTON, supra note 9, at 90-95 (describing Southern honor in Edgefield, South
Carolina); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 22, at 71 (asserting basis for Southern distrust of authority
was the ethic of honor). Pitt-Rivers notwithstanding, students of other societies have found
instances in which formal law was made part of an honor culture. See, e.g., Thomas W. Gallant,
Honor, Masculinity, and Ritual Knife Fighting in Nineteenth-Century Greece, 105 AM. HIST. REV.
359, 369-71 (2000) (discussing intersection of criminal justice and honor in context of Ichian
Island knife fighting).
24. See GROSS, supra note 22, at 53-57 (discussing the intersection of honor and law);
WYATT-BROWN, supra note 20, at 362-401.
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replaced law in some instances; thus, in the late 1820s, when Benjamin Perry,
a Reconstruction Era governor of the state, 25 was a young man practicing law
in the upstate, he challenged a newspaper editor whom he believed had falsely
impugned his character to a duel rather than press legal action against him.
Perry won the duel, killing his opponent in the process, 27 but was neither
prosecuted nor sued by his victim's family. Instead his victim's brother advised
him that the family understood the duel was necessary. 28 In other instances, as
State v. Prince29 demonstrates, those who were involved in affairs of honor
were brought to trial. In this second group of cases, honor often influenced
interpretations of law by shaping the reactions ofjurors and judges,30 and often
leading them to excuse, or punish weakly, conduct that law formally
prohibited.31
Honor directed criminal justice in other, less obvious ways. Because the
code of honor prescribed that affronts and attacks had to be punished through
public acts of personal violence or humiliation,32 many of the punishments
favored by South Carolina's courts emphasized corporal punishment or public
embarrassment. 33 So too, assumptions dictated by honor helped to guarantee
that both the formal and informal aspects of legal culture were controlled by
men. Robert Nye observed the following about nineteenth-century France:
Women had no real place in this system of honor. They
were only permitted to safeguard their sexual honor, which in
truth belonged to their husbands, fathers, and brothers, who
were ultimately responsible for its integrity and
defense.... [W]ithout honor they could not, any more than
a dishonored man, participate in most aspects of public life.34
25. See A.B. Williams, Benjamin Franklin Perry, in 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF EMINENT AND
REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE CAROLINAS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 69, 72-73 (1892).
26. Benjamin Franklin Perry, Diary, 1832-1868, at Aug. 5, 1832, Aug. 11, 1832, Aug. 23,
1832, in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN PERRY PAPERS (Southern Historical Collection, University ofNorth
Carolina Library). Perry also caned a man who he deemed had insulted him. Id. at Aug. 2, 1832.
27. Id.
28. Id. Aug. 23, 1832.
29. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
30. See BARDAGLIO, supra note 17, at 5-23 (discussing the "vigorous attachment to the
concept of honor").
31. See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 85. Williams found that guilty verdicts were entered in
only thirty-nine percent of South Carolina's criminal cases in the antebellum era. Id.
32. On the public nature of honor, see Gallant supra note 23, at 375 passim; WYATT-
BROWN, supra note 22, at 45-48 (discussing in the Southern context). On the personal nature of
honor claims in the South, see WYATT-BROwN, supra note 22, at 34-36. The violent aspect of
honor culture is examined in AYERS, supra note 22, at 21-23.
33. See AYERS, supra note 22, at 42; WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 100, 106-09.
34. ROBERT A. NYE, MASCULINITY AND MALE CODES OF HONOR IN MODERN FRANCE, at
vii (1993).
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Nye's observation applies equally well to historians' understanding of the
place of women in the legal culture of South Carolina and the rest of the
antebellum South. The courts were the exclusive preserve of men,3 and while
women were able to manipulate the law to achieve some protections in the area
of domestic relations, 36 ultimately even those gains were limited, as law
established male power more often than it constrained it.37
A. Evidence of an Alternative Forum: Some Decisions by the Informal
Court of Public Opinion
1. Columbia, South Carolina vs. James Henry Hammond
The prevailing image of the legal culture of antebellum South Carolina is
far more complex than any comparable account of the legal culture in the
antebellum North,3 8 but their emphasis on honor has led students of Southern
legal culture to overlook the evidence of the other extralegal process that
functioned in the state in that period. In this second system, women not onlyjudged but punished men and women for certain offenses.39 One infamous
incident from the history of antebellum South Carolina provides a preliminary
snapshot of how this second system functioned.
In the early 1840s, while he served as governor of South Carolina, rumors
swirled around the capital that James Henry Hammond was intimately involved
with his unmarried teenage nieces, the daughters of the politically and socially
prominent Wade Hampton II. 4 0 These rumors, which Hammond admitted in hisdiary were at least partly true,41 led him to leave Columbia for what he
35. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 83; WYATr-BROWN, supra note 22, at 281-91.
36. See BARDAGLIO, supra note 17, at 31.
37. Edwards, supra note 18, at 740.
38. Histories of the legal culture of the antebellum North have emphasized the workings of
and changes in the formal legal system. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 11 (outlining the history
of criminal justice in Philadelphia); Millender, supra note 11, at 107-45 (describing New YorkCity's legal culture from 1800-1825). As a result, the work on the legal culture of the North is not
as nuanced as that which has been done on the antebellum South.
39. Edwards notes that women used informal social networks to try to challenge the
authority of men, but does not develop the idea that these networks were effectively a legal
system. See Edwards, supra note 18, at 741. But cf STEPHANIE MCCURRY, MASTERS OF SMALLWORLDS 130-35 (1995) (recognizing the existence of one aspect of the informal courts-the
church trial-but concluding via a case study of Lenore Kelly that it was a process controlled by
men and used against women).
For a discussion of the concept of "legal systems" using that phrase to include extralegal
systems ofjustice, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479(1997) (describing application of the system analysis in the law); see also Weyrauch, supra note21 (exploring unwritten principles by which people in any organization govern themselves).
40. The matter is discussed, often obliquely, in Hammond's diary for the 1840s. See SECRET
AND SACRED: THE DIARIES OF JAMES HENRY HAMMOND, A SOUTHERN SLAVEHOLDER 171-76
(Carol Bleser ed., 1988) (hereinafter SECRET AND SACRED).
41. See id. at 120.
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characterized as exile to his plantation after his term as governor came to an
42
end. According to his diary, until he left town, Hammond was shunned in the
capital43 and avoided by long time acquaintances. 44 In addition, he bitterly
complained that people talked about him behind his back.45 While the incident
is often treated as an example of male honor culture,46 that interpretation
overlooks the details offered by Hammond in his diary, which highlights the
role of women in his ordeal. He complained that two of his most virulent
attackers, John Preston and Wade Hampton III, acted under the instigation of
their wives. 47 He assumed that another man who attacked him, John Preston's
brother William, did so at the behest of his wife, and recorded that both
William and his wife denounced him publicly. Looking back on the period
towards the end of his diary, he blamed his treatment on "the Tea Table
Goddesses" '49 and lamented that "all the women, and the nice men [still] shun
me."50 While Hammond never drew the connection between women and his
treatment at the hands of his community, his account strongly implies that
many of the men who shunned him did so under their wives' influence.
Hammond's description suggests an elaborate process that was outside the
formal legal system, but was law-like in that it served to both judge and punish
wrongdoing. It also provides a sense of the procedures of that extralegal
system: During the judgment stage, the social networks (Hammond's "tea
tables," which we know were maintained and dominated by women)51 spread
word of his breach of acceptable conduct. In this initial period, the network
weighed the evidence and determined whether it added up to an offense. Once
the network determined that norms had been violated, the judgment stage was
over and the punishment stage began. In this second period, the network issued
a public denunciation, which informed the wrongdoer, in this case Hammond,
of his community's disapproval and publicized the judgment against him.
Publicity was, then, both a means of proclaiming the judgment of the court and
a form of punishment. Other punishments were available as well: Hammond
42. Id. at 243.
43. See id. at 126-28.
44. Id. at 128.
45. See id. at 120; see also DREW GILPIN FAUST, JAMES HENRY HAMMOND AND THE OLD
SOUTH: A DESIGN FOR MASTERY 241-45 (1982) (describing Hampton's "war of rumor and
innuendo" against Hammond).
46. See BURTON, supra note 9, at 140; FAUST, supra note 45, at 243; KENNETH S.
GREENBERG, HONOR AND SLAVERY 75-77 (1996).
47. SECRET AND SACRED, supra note 40, at 185.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id. at 226.
50. Id. at 256.
51. The importance of visiting and women's networks has been established by many
historians. See, e.g., JEAN E. FRIEDMAN, THE ENCLOSED GARDEN 6 (1985) (discussing recent
historical scholarship on this topic). Women also exchanged information and maintained their
social networks through correspondence. See generally JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, A
FAMILY OF WOMEN: THE CAROLINA PETIGRUS IN PEACE AND WAR (1999) (describing the history
of a Southern family based in part on their correspondence).
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was shunned by polite society as people avoided invitations to his home and
ignored him on the streets. 52 His ostracism was so complete that he was driven
to retreat to his home in rural Silver Bluff.53
Hammond's account not only suggests the existence of an extralegal
system based on public opinion; it also reveals the role women played in the
informal courts of that system. Women served as his prosecutors, his judges,
and his jury, first determining when a violation of a community norm had
occurred, and then setting the proper punishment. But while it indicates that
women were a driving force in the process, Hammond's description suggests
that they did not work alone. Instead, women worked in tandem with their male
relatives-husbands typically, but also sons and sometimes fathers-to enforce
the punishment (shaming, shunning, or exile) the informal court deemed
proper.
2. Edgefield, South Carolina vs. Eliza Posey
In the Hammond case, the informal court acted in place of formal law. In
other cases, it functioned as a compliment, or supplement, to the formal law.
Such was the case in Edgefield, South Carolina in 1849. 54
On Friday, February 16, 1849, Matilda, wife of Martin Posey, vanished,
having last been seen in mid-afternoon directing the work of family slaves on
the Posey plantation.55 She was found just over a week later, buried in a
shallow grave in some wooded land on her husband's property.56 While she
was missing, rumors circulated wildly,57 but the day her body was uncovered,
suspicion in the community specifically turned to one of Posey's slaves, named
App, who had purportedly run away after confessing to another slave that he
had committed the murder.58 Yet a month later, a decomposing body identified
as App's was accidentally discovered in a nearby county.59
By that point, if not before, Martin Posey, long distrusted in the
community because he drank60 and admitted to beating his wife, 61 became a
52. See SECRET AND SACRED, supra note 40, at 126.
53. See id. at 243; BARDAGLIO, supra note 17, at 4.
54. The details of the case come from Report of the Trial of Martin Posey (1850)
(unpublished manuscript, available at South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina)
[hereinafter Posey Trial]. Two other summaries of the trials, which differ in some respects from
the Report, are part ofthe decisions ofthe South Carolina Court of Appeals in the Posey case. See
State v. Posey, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 103 (1849) (appeal from the conviction in the Matilda Posey
murder); State v. Posey, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 142 (1849) (appeal from the conviction for the
murder of App).
55. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 12-13.
56. Id. at 18-19.
57. See id. at 4.
58. Id. at 18-19.
59. Id. at 54 n.*.
60. Id. at 22, 32, 58.
61. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 22.
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suspect. He had not enhanced his already dubious reputation by becoming
obviously infatuated with Matilda's younger sister, Eliza,62 who, although she
was still under eighteen at the time of the murder, had already been married
and widowed.6 3 Within a day of the identification of App's body, Posey's
overseer, Wilson Kirkland, was arrested.64 Kirkland promptly accused Posey
of having App murder Matilda (so that Posey could marry Eliza) and then
murdering App. 65 That night Martin and Eliza were found hiding at Martin's
father's house and were arrested.66 Subsequently, Martin's father Francis and
his younger brother Elbert were arrested as accessories to the murder of App.
67
In October 1849, Martin Posey was brought to trial twice, once for Matilda's
murder;68 the second time, along with his brother and father, for the murder of
App.69 He was convicted both times and sentenced to death.70 His convictions
and sentences were upheld on appeal, 71 and he was hanged in the courthouse
square in Edgefield, on February 1, 1850.72 No one else was convicted in
connection with either murder. Both Posey's brother and father were found not
guilty, 73 and no charges were ever pressed against Eliza Posey, who had
married Martin sometime after their arrests.
74
The failure to convict, or even indict, Eliza seems to confirm that formal
law, influenced by the gendered assumptions of honor culture, could not
conceive of women as legal actors. The anonymous editor of a report on the
Posey trials initially suggested that Eliza's treatment at the hands of the court
proved precisely that. After noting that "[i]t is a saying in Edgefield and
elsewhere, that if a man have money, he may do any thing and not be hanged
for it, but let him kill his wife here, and the gold of California cannot buy
eloquence enough to save him,",75 he added that women were different: they
were never punished severely, even when wives were found guilty of killing
their husbands.76 Yet no sooner had he made that claim, the anonymous author
backtracked. He admitted that although formal law chose to ignore her, that did
62. Id. at 32, 39.
63. Id. at 12.
64. See id. at 26.
65. Id. at 21 n.*, 32-35.
66. Id. at 27-28.
67. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 6.
68. Id. at 9-10 (reprinting indictment).
69. Id. at 53 (reprinting indictment).
70. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 40-42; see also Trial of Martin Posey, EDGEFIELD
ADVERTISER (S.C.), Oct. 10, 1849, at 2 (reporting verdict in Matilda Posey murder); State Trials,
EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER (S.C.), Oct. 17, 1849, at 2 (reporting verdict in App murder).
71. State v. Posey, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 103, 141 (1849); State v. Posey, 35 S.C.L. (4 Strob.)
142, 166-167 (1849).
72. EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER (S.C.) Feb. 6, 1850, at 2.
73. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 71.
74. See id. at 6.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 6-7.
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not mean Eliza would escape unpunished. 7 And other evidence, from outside
the court system, suggests that she did not. Although other young widows in
late antebellum Edgefield lived alone with their children, 78 by December 1849
Eliza Posey had been stripped of her adult status and reduced to her cousin's
ward.79 She had no access to her inheritance, except for what she received as
an allowance or her guardian agreed to pay towards her expenses, nor was
she given custody of her stepchildren, who were instead living with their
paternal grandfather, Frank Posey.8 1 Eliza's separation from Martin's children
had the appearance of punishment: even if the arrangement reflected the fact
that Frank Posey could support four very young children,8 2 that does not
explain why Eliza could not live with her stepchildren at Frank Posey's, as
Posey's widowed daughter, Elizabeth Ashbel, and her daughter, Pearlina, had
done since Elizabeth's husband died. 3
The contrast between her condition before the murders and her situation
in 1850 strengthens the conclusion that Eliza Posey was being punished. There
is no evidence that she had been made anyone's ward 84 after her father died in
1847, or after she became a widow the first time in 1848. Indeed, the fact that
she moved in with Posey within days of Matilda's disappearance85 implies that
as a young widow she had considerable (one might even say extraordinary)
freedom and independence.8 6 After the murder trial, her position, to say
nothing of her allowance, was comparable to that of her youngest brother,
Stingleton, who was also their cousin's ward8 7 and who, as a sixteen-year-old
77. Id. at 7.
78. See the entries for Jane West, Martha Hobbs, and Nancy Logan, in POPULATION
SCHEDULES FOR THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: EDGEFIELD AND FAIRFIELD
COUNTIES, SOUTH CAROLINA (1850), microformed on Roll No. 852, Microcopy No. 432 (The
Nat'l Archives 1964) [hereinafter 1850 CENSUS].
79. Guardian Accounts Filed by Erasmus McDaniel on Behalf of Eliza Posey (1850-1851),
in Guardian Accounts, Edgefield County, South Carolina, at 204-05, 251,445-46, microformed
on Roll No. ED 79 (SCDAH) [hereinafter Guardian Accounts]. She apparently lived with her
uncle, Levi McDaniel, who was Erasmus' father. See id; 1850 CENSUS, supra note 78 (entry for
Levi McDaniel).
80. See Guardian Accounts, supra note 79.
81. 1850 CENSUS, supra note 78 (entry for Frank Posey).
82. Frank Posey was well off. According to the 1850 Census his land holdings alone were
worth $12,000. Id.
83. See id.
84. Her older brother, Gabriel Holmes, served as guardian ad litem for Eliza and her minor
siblings during some litigation over their father's estate, but there is no indication that his
guardianship extended beyond that matter. See Commissioner's Minutes, Edgefield, South
Carolina (Nov. 15, 1847), microformed on Roll No. ED 171, at 51 (SCDAH).
85. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 35.
86. She also traveled around quite a bit before she moved in with Posey. Gabriel Holmes
testified that before the murder Eliza had visited friends and then visited Martin and Matilda. See
State v. Posey, 4 S.C.L. (4 Strob.) 103, 105 (1849).
87. Guardian Accounts, supra note 79, at 445-46.
[Vol. 54: 627
A DIFFERENT SORT OF JUSTICE
schoolboy, 88 had far fewer claims than she to the rights and privileges of
adulthood. In slightly more than a year, Eliza escaped the situation the only
way she knew how: sometime around February 1851 she married Harry
Bush,89 and shortly thereafter they apparently moved away from South
Carolina.
90
Her reduction in status and separation from her stepchildren, to say nothing
of her quick remarriage and reputed move away from Edgefield, suggests that
Eliza was judged and punished informally by her community, even though the
formal processes of law ignored her. And in his introduction to the report on
Posey's trial, the anonymous author predicted that might happen. Having noted
that "the men [had] forgiven Eliza Posey," 91 he explained that her fate was thus
left in the hands of the women of the community, who would judge her conduct
and decide what, if anything, should be done to her.92 He urged them to treat
Eliza leniently, and forgive her, rather than "persecute her to the grave, [or]
drive her to despair., 93 He added that he hoped they would "endeavor to reform
her, to console her, to soothe her remorse and to make her the adopted mother
of her sister's fatherless, motherless, penniless, and injured children."94 Eliza's
circumstances until her marriage to Harry Bush suggests that the women of
Edgefield ignored his pleas.
3. Further Evidence of the Informal Courts
As is the case with honor culture, the records of the decisions of South
Carolina's informal courts of public opinion are usually buried in antebellum
diaries, letters, and works of literature. But even a quick glance at a few
sources of that sort reveals references to the informal courts. These examples
reinforce the impressions given by the Hammond and Posey cases,
demonstrating that the informal courts encompassed women and men, and were
exercised in the Low Country, Midlands, and Upstate, and sometimes even
beyond the state's borders.
Thus, in journals she kept of her travels in 1850-51, Jane Caroline North
noted a judgment that "they" had entered against the ne'er do well son of a
family acquaintance, and observed that it meant the ostracism of the mother as
well as the son.95 She also recounted an incident when the "Carolina Ladies"
88. The 1850 Census lists sixteen-year-old Stillman as a farmer, but also indicates that he
had been in school most of the preceding year. See 1850 CENSUS, supra note 78 (entry for Levi
McDaniel).
89. See Guardian Accounts, supra note 79, at 445-46.
90. Handwritten notation, in Holmes Surname File (available at Tompkins Library,
Edgefield, South Carolina).
91. Posey Trial, supra note 54, at 7.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. The Journals of Jane Caroline North, 1851-1852, in AN EVENING WHEN ALONE: FOUR
JOURNALS OF SINGLE WOMEN IN THE SOUTH, 1827-1867, at 190 (Michael O'Brien ed., 1993).
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organized the boycott of a ball that featured President Millard Fillmore in
protest of his politics.96 In his journal, Benjamin Perry likewise reported
instances when women of the upstate shunned him,97 or publicly condemned
his conduct. 98 Similarly, there were passing references to judgments
(sometimes entered by women of the family against other family members)
interspersed in the letters and writings of the Pettigru family.99 Additionally,
the correspondence of Marion Converse: revealed how her network of friends
and family helped her drive her husband, Augustus, out of the state after their
separation. 100 Ironically, even James Henry Hammond recognized the power
of the court of public opinion, writing, in his defense of slavery, that white men
who had notorious affairs with enslaved women lost their social positions and
were shunned.' 0'
Literary sources contain additional references to the informal courts. For
example, the antebellum novels of Charleston native Susan Petigru King made
frequent references to women who passed judgment on the behavior of others
during conversations 10 2 and described the power those women had to punish
those they decided had breached proper standards. 0 3 King's books also
confirm the breadth of the informal court's jurisdiction: some ofthejudgments
she described were entered by women against other women, 104 some against
men,10 5 some judgments were reached and publicized during teas, 10 6 others
through letters exchanged between friends and family. 107
These different references to informal judgments at the hands of public
opinion make it clear that women were not simply the passive objects of South
Carolina's antebellum legal culture, but, in some instances at least, had a far
reaching power to judge and punish as part of a system of law. In that system,
96. Id. at 167.
97. Perry, supra note 26, at Nov. 23, 1832.
98. Id. at Oct. 4, 1840.
99. PEASE& PEASE, supra note 51, at 162 (describingjudgment by women of family against
Sue Petigru King); see also id. at 54 (referring to Sue Petigru King's short story, Gossip, which
recounts an incident in which a similar sort of moral judgment was made).
100. See discussion in Edwards, supra note 18, at 745-46 & n. 18 (citations omitted).
101. James Henry Hammond, Letters of James Henry Hammond to Thomas Clarkson on
Slavery, 1845, in PRO SLAVERY ARGUMENT AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED
WRITERS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES 119 (reprint 1968) (1852).
102. See, e.g., SUSAN PETIGRU KING, Lily: A Novel, in GERALD GRAY'S WIFE; AND LILY:
A NOVEL 13 (Duke University Press 1993) (describing women at tea discussing a younger
woman's behavior); id. at 86-87 (describing widespread discussion of one young woman's illicit
flirtation with a known rogue).
103. See id. at 133. King clearly did not approve of the power of gossip networks. In Lily
the main character in the novel (who is a good and moral woman) speaks out against gossip even
as a young girl. Id. at 13.
104. See id. at 13, 86-87.
105. Id. at 86; see also SUSAN PETIGRU KING, Gerald Gray's Wife, in GERALD GRAY'S
WIFE; AND LILY: A NOVEL 372-79 (Duke University Press 1993) (letter criticizing man's
behavior).
106. KING, Lily, supra note 102, at 13, 133-34.
107. KING, Gerald Gray's Wife, supra note 105, at 372-79.
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women's networks functioned as informal courts that worked alongside the
formal legal system. Together with formal law and honor culture these informal
courts helped make up an elaborate matrix of social control, which made
antebellum South Carolina far from the lawless place it is often characterized
as having been.
III. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
One question, however, remains: what was the source of women's
authority to engage in this sort of judgment and punishment? This is
simultaneously a question about the basis of women's power to judge and
punish, and a question about the source of the norms that their judgments
enforced. 10
8
One possibility is that the informal court of public opinion represented the
female side of honor culture. Under this theory, men judged some instances of
dishonor and typically resorted to violence to punish them;10 9 women judged
other types of dishonor, using shame to punish them. Such an explanation
would expand the notion of antebellum Southern honor considerably. By
bringing women into the "honor group"' 10 for the first time, it would markedly
alter our understanding of their role in antebellum society."1 Indeed, this
interpretation is consistent with the findings in some recent works that women
did play active and public roles in the antebellum period in politics,
112
religion, 113 and reform movements.114 In addition, it would coincide with
recent works demonstrating that women in other honor cultures did participate
in those cultures' processes of judgment and punishment. 15 Likewise, this
interpretation would square with the evidence that in the seventeenth and
108. On the multifaceted nature of legal authority, see JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE
AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986).
109. Though there is some evidence men also resorted to shunning. See MICHAEL WAYNE,
DEATH OF AN OVERSEER 18-19 (2001).
110. The phrase "honor group" is used by anthropologists to describe the "set ofpeople who
follow the same code of honor and who recognize each other as doing so." FRANK HENDERSON
STEWART, HONOR 54 (1994).
111. Cf. AYERS, supra note 22, at 13 (women, children, and slaves had no honor).
112. See, e.g. ELIZABETH R. VARON, WE MEAN TO BE COUNTED (1998) (arguing elite and
middle-class women played an active role in Southern political life in the context of a Virginia
case study).
113. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. BREKUS, STRANGERS AND PILGRIMS: FEMALE PREACHING IN
AMERICA 1740-1845 (1998) (recounting stories of early female preachers).
114. BRUCE DORSEY, REFORMING MENAND WOMEN (2002) (analyzing gender in antebellum
reform movement).
115. See THOMAS W. GALLANT, EXPERIENCING DOMINION 149-74 (2002) (analyzing
women, slander, and criminal justice); Gallant, supra note 23, at 376-77 (analyzing women's use
of slander laws to affect criminal justice in Greece); see also Unni Wikan, Shame andHonour:
A Contestable Pair, 19 MAN 635 (1984) (describing relationship of shame and honor for women
in the Middle East).
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eighteenth centuries, women in the United States used shame and shaming to
discipline men and women. 116
In support of this interpretation, there is some evidence that women
participated in South Carolina's antebellum honor culture. In letters, women
from antebellum South Carolina sometimes spoke in terms of their honor,"17
and in his diary, Benjamin Perry noted a few occasions when he represented
women who brought lawsuits to avenge their honor.118 Yet while it is certainly
possible that women derived their authority to judge and shame from honor
culture, certain aspects of that explanation remain unsatisfactory.
One is a problem of power: it is unclear, for example, why Hammond,
who was certainly familiar with honor culture and worried about it in the
context of the Hampton incident, was unable to recognize that his shame was
being orchestrated by women in his community. His failure to do so suggests
that he did not understand that the court functioned as part of the honor culture,
and this raises questions about whether women really were considered part of
the honor group in antebellum South Carolina. Another problem with this
explanation relates to sources of law: the offenses with which the informal
court concerned itself, which usually involved licentiousness and immorality,
were not the stuff of honor culture. While honor, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown has
argued, was an ethic," 19 setting out guidelines for behavior, its precepts were
not typically moral, and frequently ran counter to the teachings of the
churches. 120 The informal courts' focus on moral issues was, to this extent,
inconsistent with the thrust of honor culture, which also makes it unlikely that
honor provided the source of women's authority to judge and punish.
A second possible answer is suggested by a comment by the famous
historian of Southem women's history, Anne Firor Scott. In her path-breaking
study of elite white women in the South, Scott asked: "What were they afraid
of, these would-be patriarchs who threatened to withdraw their love from
women who disagreed with them or aspired to any forbidden activity?' 12 1 She
answered herself, "Partly, perhaps, [they feared] that the women to whom they
had granted the custody of conscience and morality might apply that
conscience to male behavior-to sharp trading in the market, to inordinate
addiction to alcohol, to nocturnal visits to the slave quarters." 122The examples
from antebellum South Carolina suggest there was no "perhaps" about it:
women did sit in moral judgment.
116. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 22, at 39-40; Mary Beth Norton, Gender and
Defamation in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 19-22,36-39(1987).
117. See PEASE & PEASE, supra note 51, at 43.
118. Perry, supra note 26, at Feb. 9, 1846.
119. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 22, at 3-4.
120. Id. at 99-105.
121. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, THE SOUTHERN LADY: FROM PEDESTAL TO POLITICS, 1830-1930,
19(1970).
122. Id.
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As Scott's comment suggests, contemporary accounts repeatedly affirmed
that women in the antebellum South had a special moral capacity, and the
idea that women had a unique moral understanding shaped one South
Carolinian's interpretation of another famous judgment by women. 124 On New
Year's Day, 1829, John Eaton, Andrew Jackson's political protrg6, married
Margaret Timberlake, a widow who, rumor had it, had been sexually
promiscuous (with Eaton as well as others) during her previous marriage. 125 In
the months preceding the wedding, Eaton complained that "the whispers of
those city gossipers who attend to every body's reputation[,] character[,] &
business to the neglect of their own" became increasingly focused on his
forthcoming marriage.126
Talk continued after the Eatons returned to the capital from their wedding
trip, and worsened when Jackson announced that he was appointing Eaton
Secretary of War. When one high-ranking official, Colonel Nathan Towson,
the army paymaster, tried to suggest to Jackson that hostility to the marriage
made Eaton a poor choice for cabinet officer, Jackson snubbed him,
announcing he had no intention of consulting "the ladies of Washington" about
his cabinet choices. 127 His failure to do so destroyed his cabinet, as members
of his administration ostracized the Eatons, ultimately forcing Jackson to
request that every member of his cabinet, including Eaton, resign.'28 From our
perspective, it is significant that while the campaign against the Eatons was led
by the women of Washington society, most accounts agree that the crucial first
moment arose when Floride Calhoun, wife of Vice President John C. Calhoun,
refused to return the Eaton's formal visit to her home.
129
123. See, e.g., PEASE & PEASE, supra note 51, at 83 (describing Mitchell King's view that
women had a "higher morality" than men). Likewise, Robert Allston noted women's special moral
power. See id. at 113.
124. See generally CATHERINE ALLGOR, PARLOR POLITICS 190-238 (2000) (describing the
John Eaton affair in the context of women's social authority); JOHN F. MARSZALEK, THE
PETTICOAT AFFAIR (1997) (describing Eaton affair in the context of entrenched elite).
125. For two recent accounts that offer very different interpretations of the event, see
MARSZALEK, supra note 124, and ALLGOR, supra note 124, at 190-238.
126. MARSZALEK, supra note 124, at 46 (alteration in original).
127. Id. at 65. Others have criticized Marszalek's analysis of the incident, noting there are
alternative interpretations. See, e.g., Norma Basch, Family Values and Nineteenth-Century
American Politics, 26 REv. INAM. HIST. 687,691-92 (1998) (arguing Marszalek fails to appreciate
the "gendered nature of politics"). Basch cites one work in particular, Kirsten E. Wood, "One
Woman So Dangerous": Gender and Power in the Eaton Affair, 17 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC
237 (1997), arguing that it provides a more persuasive interpretation. Id. at 691.
128. See ALLGOR, supra note 124, at 208.
129. See MARGARET L. COIT, JOHN C. CALHOUN 198-200 (1950). Catherine Allgor refers
to Floride Calhoun's act as "one impetus" in the battle. ALLGOR, supra note 124, at 203.
Marszalek emphasizes that Floride Calhoun left Washington before the contretemps got under
way, but still credits her role as an aidor and abbeter. See MARSZALEK, supra note 124, at 54, 73.
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In a statement he prepared to justify his role in the controversy, 3' Calhoun
characterized his wife's decision not to make the visit as the product of careful
deliberation. When the Eatons called on the Calhoun house together one
afternoon they were received by Mrs. Calhoun, but that evening Mrs. Calhoun
decided not to return their call.' 31 As she explained that decision to her
husband, she felt it was not her place to judge Margaret Eaton's morality, since
she was a not a permanent part of Washington society, but she did feel some
sort ofjudgment was needed.132 She refused to lend countenance to the Eatons
by returning their visit until the ladies of Washington society decided whether
Margaret Eaton would be accepted into their number or shunned as punishment
for her past. Upon being advised of her views, John agreed to defer to her
judgment, even though he "foresaw the [political] difficulties"'133 that would
arise. He explained that he accepted her decision because he felt that matters
of this sort were best left to women, 134 adding that the "question involved,"
which he clarified to mean the issue of moral standards, 135 was "paramount to
all political considerations."' 13
6
What was the source of this moral insight? In his discussion of Calhoun's
conduct in the Eaton affair, Merrill Peterson concluded that his reaction was
influenced by the ideas of William Paley.137 Paley argued in The Principles of
Moral and Political Philosophy that morally pure women should avoid
immoral women. 138 But Paley's suggestion that virtuous women should
withdraw from unsavory company does not correspond to Calhoun's
description of his wife's reaction. Floride Calhoun was not content to merely
avoid the Eatons. She awaited a judgment on their conduct and a ruling that
determined how they should be treated. Nor were the women who Hammond
130. JOHN C. CALHOUN, Reply to John H. Eaton's Address, in 6 PAPERS OF JOHN C.
CALHOUN 474-82 (Clyde Wilson ed., 1978).
131. Id. at 476. In his reply, Calhoun expressly denied Eaton's claim that Floride Calhoun
had visited the Eaton's first, leaving her card. Id. at 475. Marszalek disputes this, and strongly
suggests that Floride Calhoun did visit first, though he concedes in his footnotes that the evidence
is not conclusive either way. MARSZALEK, supra note 124, at 54-55, 249 n. 19. The situation is not
quite as unclear as he suggests, as Calhoun noted in his reply, the established protocol was that
people visited the Vice President first, and only then did the Vice President or his wife return the
call. It is somewhat unlikely that Floride Calhoun would have initiated a visit in that circumstance.
See CALHOUN, supra note 130, at 476.
132. CALHOUN, supra note 130, at 476-77.
133. ld. at476.
134. Id. at481.
135. Id. at 477. Marszalek quotes Calhoun's reference to morality, but interprets it to mean
that "[t]he Eaton Affair was a social, not a political, matter." MARSZALEK,supra note 124, at 196.
Notwithstanding that interpretation, contemporaries understood the matter involved a moral
judgment. See John Quincy Adams' assessment of Calhoun's position, quoted in ALLGOR, supra
note 124, at 208.
136. CALHOUN, supra note 130, at 477.
137. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN
183-84 (1987).
138. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 223 (1785).
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complained of content to passively withdraw from his presence; some, notably
the wife of William Preston, sought him out to denounce his conduct. These
women actively judged and condemned moral failings.
Similarly, the writings of another antebellum novelist from South Carolina,
William Gilmore Simms, credited women with a special power to actively
judge and explicitly tied that power to religion. In one of Simms' early novels,
Guy Rivers, the hero, Ralph Colleton, had many good qualities, but frequently
misinterpreted situations and people, to the extent that he had to depend on a
variety of women to negotiate the morally proper path. 139 Significantly, given
Hammond's inability to recognize women's judgment, while Colleton needed
women's help, he was completely oblivious to the fact he did so. Colleton
denied that women had the power to offer moral judgment because their
susceptibility rendered them incapable of evaluating public conduct.14 But not
all men in the book had similar blind spots. Guy Rivers, the villain of the piece,
was an outlaw who rejected both formal laws and the customary standards of
his community. He was brought to judgment by the actions of three women and
recognized the moral strength of each. 141 Significantly, the strongest moral
authority in Guy Rivers was Lucy Munro, and Simms made it clear that her
moral wisdom came from two sources: she had been well educated when she
was a child,142 and she complimented the lessons of her education with piety
as an adult.143 In his later books, Simms made the connection between religion
(specifically protestant Christianity) and women's moral wisdom explicit,
offering a number of female characters whose piety shames and guides men to
proper behavior. 144
This idea that pious Christian women had unique moral insight, which
empowered them to judge moral failing, was also a theme in a spiritual
biography, written in the early nineteenth century by Moses Waddel, president
of the University of Georgia, 145 Presbyterian minister, 146 and teacher, relative,
139. WILLIAM GILMORE SIMMs, Guy RIVERS: A TALE OF GEORGIA 92-93 (John Caldwell
Guilds ed., University of Arkansas Press 1993) (1835) (describing scene where Lucy Monroe
recognizes Rivers' evil; Colleton does not); id. at 144-46 (same); id. at 223-28 (describing where
Lucy Monroe has to stand up to Rivers to protect Colleton). The other women in the novel,
Colleton's cousin Edith, who was also his fiancee, and Ellen, Rivers' mistress, also revealed moral
insight and wisdom superior to that of the men in the book. See id. at 429 (Edith corrects Ralph's
errors with respect to Lucy.); id. at 445-48 (Ellen compels Rivers to understand his failings.).
140. See id. at 179.
141. SIMMs, supra note 139, at 225, 359-63, 445-48.
142. Id. at 95.
143. Id. at 120.
144. Simms' later novels made the case for religion even more strongly. See, e.g., WILLIAM
GILLMORE SIMMs, EUTAW: A SEQUEL TO THE FORAYERS 84, 88, 101 (1853) (exploring religious
aspect of Ellen Flynn's goodness); id. at 250-51 (education not enough, it must have a moral,
specifically religious basis).
145. THOMAS WALKER REED, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 182 (1949),
http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/reed/.
146. PETERSON, supra note 137, at 20.
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and mentor of John C. Calhoun. 147 The biography, of a young woman named
Carolyn Smelt,148 offered a powerful version of women's moral authority that
emphasized active judgment. Smelt died before she reached twenty, but from
her earliest age she had a strong religious sensibility. 149 She found dancing
class unpleasant when she was virtually a toddler,150 a horse race made her sick
when she was no more than eight,151 and, although tempted by vanity when she
was in her teens, 152 she quickly saw and rejected the evils in a life of
ambition153 and indulgence. This revealed her natural moral sensibility, and
from her earliest years others respected and deferred to it. 155 But it was not
until she actively embraced religion that Carolyn began to judge others. Then,
she made up for lost time, remonstrating with her friends, her parents, and
anyone else who happened upon her, denouncing them for indulgent
behavior. 156 Waddel ascribed to Smelt a role as judge and justified her power
to do so from her piety and the tenets of evangelical Protestantism. 157
Read together, Simms' description of the moral authority wielded by
devout women, Waddel's account of Carolyn Smelt's power to judge moral
error, and Calhoun's deference to his wife's moral judgment, offer the key to
the informal courts' authority. In the process, they suggest that at some level
the informal courts of public opinion had their roots in the evangelical
tradition,158 which was, of course, quite strong in antebellum South Carolina.
That influence was marked in several ways: practices of the "court"
resembled the disciplinary practices of evangelical congregations, particularly
in Southem states, where the various denominations, Methodist, Baptist, and
Presbyterian, used shame as both a process of judgment and a means of
punishment. 159 As was the case with the informal courts, when shaming itself
147. Id. at 20-21.
148. MOSES WADDEL, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF MISS CAROLYN ELIZABETH SMELT (New
York, Daniel Fanshaw 1818).
149. Id. at 11.
150. Id. at 15.
151. Id. at 17-18.
152. Id. at 26-27.
153. Id. at 27.
154. WADDEL, supra note 148, at 34-35.
155. Id. at21, 34.
156. Id. at 65, 69, 81, 87-88, 89-90, 97-98.
157. For other hints that pious women had a recognized power to judge, see the obituaries
of pious women set out in the Edgefield newspaper. Obituary, EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER (S.C.),
May 17, 1938, at 3; Obituary, EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER (S.C.), Aug. 30, 1838, at 3; Obituary,
EDGEFIELDADVERTISER (S.C.), Dec. 20, 1838, at 3; see also The Mother, EDGEFIELD ADVERTISER(S.C.), Feb. 9, 1837, at 1.
158. BREKUS, supra note 113, at 147-52 (discussing the role of evangelical churches in
shaping notions of female moral power in the antebellum era).
159. There were, of course, evangelical churches in the North in this period, and those
churches also made a point of church discipline. See generally BARBARA LESLIE EPSTEIN, THE
POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY 24-30 (1981) (outlining goals and means of church discipline in
eighteenth century New England); SUSAN JUSTER, DISORDERLY WOMEN 75-107 (1994)(examining meaning and exercise of internal discipline in evangelical churches in years following
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was not enough, some denominations excommunicated offenders, exiling them
from their community and from fellowship of any sort with church members,
who were advised to shun the excommunicated in all but the most essential
dealings. 16 Evangelical teachings also provided a justification for women
speaking out against moral errors, 161 in effect taking a role as judge. While
women's role in church discipline has been subject to considerable dispute
among historians, 162 studies have suggested that among Southern evangelicals,
perhaps far more than among their Northern counterparts, women were seen as
"protector[s] of morality" who had, "[b]y virtue of divine creation," the "duty
of preserving the home and its school of virtue."
163
This explanation also helps explain why some, like Hammond, were
oblivious to the court's workings. While many evangelicals shared Waddel's
conviction that women had an innate moral sense far stronger than that given
to men, there was little agreement within denominations or among evangelicals
as a whole about what this entailed. 164 Some held that women's moral capacity
gave them the duty to advise men and offer them the moral guidance they
needed since they lacked a strong internal moral compass. Others believed
women's authority was properly limited to children, giving women a duty to
instruct their young in order to help them develop moral sensibilities.
Evangelical views provided a basis of gender expectations, and those
expectations in turn authorized women to judge morality. But because there
Awakening in New England).
160. See GREGORY WILLS, DEMOCRATIC RELIGION 41-46 (1997).
161. See BREKUS, supra note 113, at 274-75.
162. There is a range of theories ofthe role ofwomen in evangelical church discipline. Some
emphasize the extent to which women were punished by churches. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra
note 5 1, at 14-18 (analyzing role of women in church by punishment statistics); JUSTER, supra
note 159, at 106 (comparing gender disparaties in church disciplinary proceeding). This
interpretation is challenged in BREKUS, supra note 113, at 152 (arguing "pious females" were
essential part of church's authority). Likewise, the issue of whether Northern and Southern
evangelicals had different practices is also sharply contested. Compare Edward R. Crowther, Holy
Honor: Sacred and Secular in the Old South, 58 J. S. HIsT. 619, 620 (1992) (urging Southern
distinctiveness), with Frederick A. Bode, The Formation of Evangelical Communities in Middle
Georgia: Twiggs County, 1820-1861, 60 J. S. HIsT. 711, 714 n.4 (1994) (denying distinctiveness),
and JOHN W. QUIST, RESTLESS VISIONARIES: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF ANTEBELLUM REFORM IN
ALABAMA AND MICHIGAN 80-82 (1998) (surveying literature exploring role of women in
benevolence movements).
The stronger argument seems to be that the degree of autonomy and authority evangelical
women had depended on the congregation. See, e.g., BREKUS, supra note 113, at 131 (asserting
role ofwomen in church was shaped by their "distinctive cultural environments"); BURTON,supra
note 9, at 132-33 (describing examples ofSouthem women assuming leadership roles in church);
WILLS,supra note 160, at 50-60 (exploring role ofwomen in different religious sects); Frederick
Bode, A Common Sphere: White Evangelicals and Gender in Antebellum Georgia, 79 GA. HIST.
Q. 775, 780-88 (1995) (exploring the role of women in the Georgia church).
163. WILLS, supra note 160, at 56.
164. See generally id. at 50-59 (describing various ideas of thc appropriate role ofwomen);
see also BREKUS, supra note 113, at 131 (same).
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was no single evangelical view of women, their authority to render judgment
remained ambiguous. 165
This is not to say that the informal court of public opinion was run out of
the evangelical church; rather, evangelical notions about the moral sense of
women went beyond evangelical circles to shape the way that Southern society
viewed women and their role in society. Evangelical ideas could have this
influence because their reach extended far into antebellum Southern society.
While many white leaders in antebellum South Carolina were not evangelical,
but rather counted themselves as Episcopalian (a complicated idea itself, since
there were evangelical Episcopalians), a number attended evangelical church
even as they held membership in a local Episcopal church.' Others who
remained outside the church were influenced by family members and mentors
who were evangelical, or by evangelical materials published in local papers
and journals. 167 Hammond and the Calhouns are cases in point. Hammond was
no evangelical, but while he rented a pew at an Episcopal church in Columbia,
he also attended Baptist and Methodist services with some frequency and had
been to evangelical revivals in his youth.' 68 His view of women's moral
capacity was consistent with what we might call a weak evangelical approach;
165. Thus, the Mountain Creek Baptist Church of Edgefield charged men with investigating
disciplinary matters, but the congregation as a whole, a group that included women, determined
the discipline for church members. See, e.g., Mountain Creek Baptist Church Records, 1835-1854,
Meeting of February 22, 1834, in THE BAPTIST HISTORICAL COLLECTION (Furman University,
Greenville, South Carolina) (Committee of two men, James and Simpson Mathis, asked toinvestigate report about church member D.H. Jones. Committee of three men, J. Still, B. Ledsoe,
and J. Rambo, asked to look into reports about Monk and Steven, slaves. One man, Trapp, asked
to look into reports about Nancy Mars); id. at Meeting of March 22, 1834 (Church congregation
met, forgave D.H. Jones. Dismissed Nancy Mars. Case of Steven, slave, put over.); id. at Meeting
of June 21, 1834 (Steven, slave, expelled.). See the discussion of the range of church practices in
Edgefield, South Carolina, in BURTON, supra note 9, at 132-33. Leading ministers in the Baptist
Church were divided on the issue of women's participation, with Jesse Mercer, of Georgia,
arguing that women should be active participants in church discipline, and J.A. Wynne, also of
Georgia, arguing that they should not be allowed to speak in disciplinary sessions. This debate is
set out in WILLS, supra note 160, at 51-52, 55-59; see generally id. at 11, 50-5 1; Bode, The
Formation of Evangelical Communities, supra note 162, at 724 (discussing women's role inSunday schools); Bode, A Common Sphere, supra note 162, at 783 (describing different roles of
women in different churches); id. at 787-88 (describing different education theories of different
evangelicals); id. at 795-96 (describing reform activity by some evangelical women).
166. There were, of course, evangelical Episcopalians, typically called "low church
Episcopalians." See generally DIANE HOCKSTEDT BUTLER, STANDING AGAINST THE WHIRLWIND
(1995) (recounting history of Evangelical party in the Episcopal church).
167. BURTON, supra note 9, at 68-69; see also Bode, A Common Sphere, supra note 162, and
Bode, Formation ofan Evangelical Community, supra note 162 (examining structure and format
of evangelical churches in Georgia). For a demonstration of the significance of class in Northern
evangelical circles, see, for example, EPSTEIN, supra note 159, at 90 passim. Richard Rankin
argued that there were class distinctions that kept elites out of the evangelical churches in North
Carolina, but he concedes that elite women had connections to evangelical religion. RiCHARD
RANKIN, AMBIVALENT CHURCHMEN AND EVANGELICAL CHURCHWOMEN 173-74 (1993).
168. FAUST, supra note 45, at 262-63.
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he accepted that it was his wife's job to instruct their children in moral
behavior, 169 even as he apparently denied she had any right to judge his own.
Where Hammond's blinkered view of women's capacity for moral
judgment suggested he had absorbed a limited sense of the moral authority of
women, others took from evangelism a stronger view. Neither Calhoun was
evangelical; he was a skeptic, she an Episcopalian. Yet both had close ties to
evangelicals-John to his teacher Moses Waddel, and both John and Floride
to her mother, an increasingly active evangelical. 170 Their reactions during the
Eaton affair, in particular their assumption that women were not merely
preceptors of moral virtues but judges of moral errors, rested on the strong
sense of woman's moral role, very similar to that described by Waddel in his
spiritual biography of Carolyn Smelt.
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases suggest that informal courts of public opinion existed as a site
of extralegal justice in antebellum South Carolina. The existence of these
courts requires a reconsideration of the conventional account of the legal
culture of the state, since these courts run counter to the conventional emphasis
on honor and its depiction of a system mostly in the control of men. In
addition, to the extent that these courts derived their authority and their view
of justice from evangelical ideals, they raise a question, hitherto unexamined
by legal historians, about the extent to which Protestant ideals influenced the
formal law within the state. In either event, by complicating the picture we
have of the legal culture of antebellum South Carolina, these cases help to
weaken the simplistic notion that antebellum South Carolina was merely
lawless.
169. Id. Drew Gilpin Faust concludes that Hammond rejected the teachings of evangelical
religion. Id. The complexities of Hammond's beliefs are discussed in Crowther, supra note 162,
at 625-27 (suggesting, following Faust, that Hammond's attitude toward evangelical religion
reflected his sense that it was taking power from elite men).
170. Of course, this is not to say that the Calhouns embraced evangelical ideals. As Nivens
notes in his study of Calhoun, both John and Floride were less than happy about her mother's
embrace of evangelism. JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION 104 (1988).
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